Beyond the Jornadas de Junho¹:
FROM THE STREET DEMONSTRATIONS TO THE VOICE OF THE MULTITUDE —
REFLECTIONS ON POLITICAL EXERCISES IN PUBLIC SPACES IN THE ERA OF
NETWORKS

Por trás das Jornadas de Junho:
DAS MANIFESTAÇÕES DE RUA À VOZ DA MULTIDÃO — REFLEXÕES SOBRE O EXERCÍCIO POLÍTICO
NOS ESPAÇOS PÚBLICOS EM TEMPOS DE REDE

Piero Carapiá Lima Baptista A, B, D, E, F
José Carlos Huapaya Espinoza D, E, F
Universidade Federal da Bahia, Faculdade de Arquitetura, Salvador, Bahia, Brasil

Abstract: The month of June 2013 has entered the annals of recent Brazilian history, due to
the street protests throughout the country’s major cities, which showcased facets of the country’s reality
to a world already focused on Brazil, as it prepared to host the 2014 World Cup. The aim of this article
is to summarize the manifestations, which took place in public spaces, contextualize them into recent
Brazilian events, and demonstrate how they appeared as a consequence of the increasing loss of political
voice in contemporary society due to globalization. This same phenomenon would seem to present its
own possible solutions to the very problems it has created, such as those indicated by Milton Santos
(2000), Hardt and Negri (2005), mostly through networked actions and the concept of “multitude”.
However, having moved on a few years from the Jornadas de Junho, the particular dissensions and lack of
clarity surrounding the demands reveal a horizon on which political participation is still vacillating and
confused.

Keywords: Jornadas de Junho; mega-events; political participation; globalization; network society; manifestations; public space.

Resumo: O mês de junho de 2013 entrou para a história recente do Brasil em decorrência de pro-
testos realizados nas ruas das principais metrópoles do país, exposto a realidade brasileira como uma
vitrine global, circunstância oportunizada pelos preparativos para a Copa do Mundo de 2014. Este artigo
objetiva discutir as manifestações ocorridas no espaço público, além de contextualizar os eventos brasileiros
recentes, entendidos como consequência da crescente perda de voz política da sociedade contemporânea diante
da globalização. Esse mesmo fenômeno parece apresentar as possíveis soluções aos problemas que cria, tal como
apontam Santos (2000) e Hardt e Negri (2005), através, sobretudo, das ações em rede e do conceito de “mul-
tidão”. No entanto, alguns anos após as Jornadas de Junho, as dissonâncias particulares e a falta de clareza das
petições revelam um horizonte de participação política ainda vacilante e confuso.

Palavras-chave: Jornadas de Junho; megaeventos; participação política; globalização; sociedade em rede; manifestações; espaço público.

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¹ This was the name given to the demonstrations, which broke out in Brazil during the Confederations Cup in 2013. Initially, in São Paulo, the
focus was not on the Cup, but rather on the increases in public transport fares, giving rise to the slogan “it’s not about the 20 cents”.
INTRODUCTION

To begin to understand the logic behind the recent demonstrations and protests in Brazil, most notably after June 2013, it must be recognized that technological advances, the development and modernization of the media and the intrinsic characteristics of the paradigm of globalized life have evolved to the point that we are currently experiencing a network society (CASTELLS, 2009). Within this format, in addition to the traditional networks (power, road, water etc.), the influence and relevance of telecommunication and digital networks are growing, constituting distinctive forms of socialization and communication. Translating this reality into the sphere of urban life may reveal new mechanisms for appropriating the city, spreading ideas and, in particular, mobilizing physical encounters within urban spaces through the media and virtual networks, such as: the Arab Spring2, which spread across a number of countries between 2010 and 2012 and helped to remove regimes such as those of Mubarak and Gaddafi, the protests across Europe because of unemployment and the 2008 economic crisis, the Occupy Wall Street protests, active since 2011 in New York, and many other Occupy movements around the world.

Although virtual networks allow extremely easy social interactions, they do not occur completely indiscriminately or without filters. As with face-to-face relationships, the interaction between social network users also tends to be defined by personal affinities, a sense of belonging, self-recognition, affirmation of identity and goals or interests in common, with or without specific territorial locus (PERUZZO, 2002). Nevertheless, the huge gatherings we are attempting to understand have ended up spilling out onto the streets and squares, especially those with symbolic appeal, as in the case of the Jornadas de Junho, being motivated to do so by some great common interest or shared sentiment.

In June 2013, Brazil experienced a moment of political and social effervescence, becoming both the stage for large demonstrations as well as a showcase for the world, revealing autonomous mechanisms of resistance and, within the process, baring a society with a long list of demands. It should be remembered that Brazil had been preparing to host the mega-event of the 2014 World Cup since 2007, when the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) officially announced its decision, and demonstrations erupted even more strongly during the Confederations Cup in 2013, which is considered the most important test event for the World Cup. When the persuasive arguments regarding the legacies of this mega event no longer seemed to meet with approval throughout the country, protests began to surface on a global scale against overspending, problems with public transport, health and security, as well as the excessive care to meet the demands of an entity such as FIFA at the expense of the population. Although the example of Brazil and of the demonstrations in June 2013 (see Figure 1) were of great concern to the organizers of the mega-event and to the Brazilian government, there was also considerable national and international support, as acknowledged by the German newspaper Zeit: “The main sports federations will have to rethink their behavior [...] For this: thank you, Brazil” (“OBRIGADO”, 2013). Within a context where injustice, a lack of transparency, budget overruns, human rights abuses and exceptional measures that often ran counter to the rule of law - observed in recent history to a lesser extent in the 2006 World Cup in Germany, and to a greater degree in 2010, in South Africa (PAULA; BARTELT, 2014) - Brazil’s message given out on a global scale was: we will fight in the streets for the changes we want and we will be heard.

2 The democratic movements, which began in Tunisia (December 2010), quickly spread to other countries across the Middle East and North Africa. The manifestations grew significantly because of the repercussion and speed with which the news spread through the social networks in the internet.
Figure 1: Multitude of demonstrators in the Jornadas de Junho of 2013


To enter into detail regarding the 2014 World Cup and its preparations would require another article, but it is important to state that although the Jornadas de Junho had initially broken out in response to the increase in public transport fares, the mega-event contributed decisively to the notoriety of the demonstrations, ensuring a voice to the multitude through both virtual and informal means, and at least in essence, unmindful of partisan issues. This aspect serves to contextualize the moment and, to some extent, suggests that the proximity of the 2016 Olympics in Rio de Janeiro may trigger off a similar process for a number of reasons, even though the “tone” of the demonstrations have mostly moved towards to the conflict between federal government supporters and opposition supporters, between those who defend impeachment of the president and those who consider it to be a coup (among many other agendas such as corruption and removing the Speaker of the House, Eduardo Cunha, from public office, for example).

While recognizing this is a vast thematic field, for an analysis of the protests and their recent developments in public spaces, we believe it is more expedient to investigate how these phenomena occur within the political sphere, by which mechanisms they are structured and whether it would be possible to obtain any real gain in political citizen participation, since records on the facts, the demonstrations in each city, the numbers involved and the material and journalistic examinations have been carried out to exhaustion, either by the formal media, or by autonomous journalism from social movements and virtual channels. For example, if we were to examine some of the reports from June 2013, the On marketing digital website published an unofficial estimate that “more than 200 thousand people attended in Rio de Janeiro, 65 thousand in São Paulo, 20 thousand in Minas Gerais, 10 thousand in Rio Grande do Sul, Paraná and the Federal District, 13 thousand in Pará, 5 thousand in Espírito Santo and Ceará, 4 thousand in Bahia and 2 thousand in Maceió and Pernambuco” (O PAPEL, 2013, author’s translation). This is without
mentioning the abundance of hashtags associated with the protests, video-complaints regarding police abuse and repression or boycotts by the formal media, and events posted on Facebook, viral expressions such as “Come to the streets”3 and “The giant has woken up”4 (demonstrating that the advertising campaigns, which had become an apology for “grandeur” and “joy” of the FIFA world cup in Brazil could effectively be appropriated by the protesters)5, and the “Collaborative Map #protestosbr”, the real-time mapping of protests and demonstrations throughout Brazil.

As a result of this aggrandizement of the demonstrations, both in terms of the numbers taking part and the topics they were dealing with, it may be perceived that what originally began as a concise, specific demand, embraced by a heterogeneous mass that perceived commonalities not in their differences, but rather within a problem that would affect everyone, had moved on to a broader, more diverse agenda, often criticized for not having a clear direction, and for fighting “against everything that’s out there”. Leonardo Sakamoto, in an article for Cidades Rebeldes: Passe Livre e as manifestações que tomaram as ruas do Brasil (“Rebel Cities: the free travel pass and the demonstrations that took to the Brazilian streets”), describes how in addition to the popular movements, and militants from the Free Travel Pass Movement and political parties, most of whom were from the left, the demonstrations were now joined by a significant layer from the “[...] ‘white elite of São Paulo’, the so-called ‘new middle class’, who were upwardly mobile, holding on to consumption symbols as their reference (and their absence as depression)” (SAKAMOTO, 2013, author’s translation). Added to these, there were: members of the extreme right, some of whom were nostalgic for the Military Dictatorship, and also the “black blocs”, which divided public opinion, either fairly or unfairly, for being compared to rioters, which apparently served as sufficient justification for strong police repression, use of excessive force, arbitrary arrests and, not unexpectedly, retaliatory responses from the protesters.

With regards to the driving force behind the protests – which is one of the points we seek to address more closely herein – it may be noted that even developed countries are facing crises of economic polarization, with a marked loss of economic and political power not only among the poor, but also throughout the middle classes. Saskia Sassen6 states that protests such as the Occupy Wall Street, are due to the increasing wealth of around 20% of the population and the impoverishment or informalization of the others7, demonstrating a clear break in the social pact with the characteristic middle class during the years of Fordism. This form of action, which greatly resembles the paralyzations brought about by union strikes, often takes to the streets in various forms of protest or social statement, extrapolating across numerous borders in order to perceive the unity of ideas even when separated by different territories, thus demonstrating that the dissatisfaction, which led to the demonstrations of the Jornadas de Junho is not only a Brazilian peculiarity. In October 2011, an interview with Sassen generated a report entitled “The ‘powerless’ are making history” (“Os ‘sem poder’ estão a fazer História”) (HENRIQUES, 2011), in which, besides emphasizing the importance of the protests, further explains that the city is also a space where voices have historically gained recognition, are able to meet and to realize they are not alone.

Sassen recognizes that there is a sense of deep pain, frustration, dissatisfaction and even anger, which with the advancement of the media and the direct integration between different people, often with similar problems, leads to identification and
even solidarity; at which point the social networks enter. For her, while the networks integrate, facilitate interaction and agility among the demonstrators, by no means do they create demonstrations, they merely intensify the contact between people who have already experienced a feeling of revolt against this invisible social contract that has been broken, i.e., what has been witnessed since June 2013 are not merely “Facebook or Twitter revolutions.” In considering the Brazilian case, long after the “painted faces” movement of 1992, which contributed to the impeachment of President Collor, over recent years there have been several other street demonstrations, such as Occupy Sampa⁸ in São Paulo in 2011, Occupy Estelita⁹ in Recife, in 2012 to the present day, and the Vacate Movement¹⁰, in Salvador in 2012, although the Jornadas de Junho in June 2013 portrayed exponentially bigger protests, which have reverberated until today, especially by “pointing the way” for more recent protests, they do not however constitute the country’s pioneering cases.

Due to this growing wave of mobilizations, a number of authors have proposed reflections on the reasons behind these facts and the relevance of this Brazilian moment. Erminia Maricato suggests that the reasons for the crisis may be encountered in the Brazilian “urban issue”, in the persistent benefits for a limited portion of the population, thus ensuring that traditional urban and political exclusions are maintained, together with the precarious transport and public facilities, which culminated in the protests (MARICATO, 2013).

For Vainer, part of what is observed may be explained by the years of consolidated popular movements that, despite the numerous conscious attempts to mobilize people and become united under some common agenda in the face of so many particular concerns, finally saw the materialization of Marx’s “metaphor of the old mole”, who works underground until he suddenly emerges in revolution with the “freshness that has not been contaminated by the ideology of entrepreneurship and competitive individualism [...]” (VAINER, 2013, p. 36, author’s translation).

For Harvey, who has reflected on contemporary urban mobilizations, what motivates and differentiates these genuinely popular manifestations from others under the agency of constituent power is that, using the concepts of Lefebvre (2001a), the right to the city can only be formulated when there is a renewed, transformed right to urban life that “[...] is therefore much more than a right of access to what already exists: it is the right to change the city more in accordance with the desire of our hearts” (HARVEY, 2013, p. 28, author’s translation).

Assisting with a broader understanding of the issue, Maricato, in the text Nunca fomos tão participativos: reflexões sobre os movimentos sociais urbanos (We never been so participative: reflections on urban social movements), highlights the importance of differentiating between social movements such as MST, or the genuine, autonomous manifestations of the population, as we have seen recently in Brazil, and those derived from broad cooptation/corruption promoted by organizations of power, especially the municipal executive power and private companies. Thus, there has been a certain urgency for popular participation to remain ineffective in public hearings, the criterion of which is “what favors some of them is carried through, but what goes against them is ignored” (MARICATO, 2011, p. 96, author’s translation), a practice that in fact contributes greatly to the widespread feeling that the real desires of the population are not heard¹¹, while meeting the necessary requirements in order to spark off the demonstrations.

By seeking a deeper understanding of what leveraged the demonstration, together with its current and future developments, a glimmer of hope will be sought

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⁸ A movement, which occupied the Anhangabaí Valley proposing a nonviolent, nonpartisan political organization, willing to implement greater discussion and direct political participation in decisions.

⁹ This appeared in response to the purchase of land in the region of the Cais José Estelita by private groups in 2008. Active since 2012, the movement has suffered violent reprisals from the police force.

¹⁰ Motivated by the dissatisfaction with the mayor at the time - João Henrique, very much because of the preparations of the 2014 World Cup, this referred to the intention to force the mayor “vacate” his position. Stepping back in time, in 2003 Salvador was the protagonist for the “Revolta do Buzu”, similar to “it’s not for the twenty cents” in 2013.

¹¹ These issues were addressed by Arantes, Vainer and Maricato (2000) in A cidade do pensamento único: desmanchando consensos.
in order to reconquer the right to exercise political participation, which seems to have become repressed and inefficient through the normal channels of representative politics in Brazil, although herein we are not decreeing its death nor rendering it completely disabled. It is for this reason that the present article proposes to reflect on the concept of “multitude” in this era of the “Global Empire” as described by Hardt and Negri (2005), so as to understand how it may help to shape an experimental strategy of resistance within a scenario restricted to political exercise, and that within the network and street demonstrations encounters the possibility of being achieved. Before this, however, it is necessary to obtain a better understanding of how the demonstrations would be viewed and how they originate in public spaces from a sociological perspective, as well as examining what has led to this state of deep political violence that now accompanies contemporary life, whose fraying at the edges seems to have led to the most recent protests.

PUBLIC SPACE AS THE STAGE FOR COLLECTIVE POLITICAL ACTIONS AND PROTESTS AS LEGITIMATE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Perhaps surprise with the proportion of public street demonstrations because of the abovementioned events has led to the belief that public protests were not so common. In fact, virtual communication at the expense of physical contact and the establishment of shopping centers as contemporary living spaces on the grounds of comfort and security, among other factors typical of globalized contemporaneity, appear to have resulted in political apathy, a lack of appropriating public spaces and individualism.

Collective manifestations have had a significant presence throughout human history, and have not been restricted to the everyday manifestations of “the left”. In other words, conservative institutions (traditionally viewed politically as being on the “right”), have also had their moments of manifestations (MAGALHAES, 2013), such as the March of the Family with God for Freedom¹², for example, and rediscovered a space and voice within the political dichotomy established between pro-PT and anti-PT before and after the October 2014 national elections. In As manifestações no espaço público: a rua como lugar da expressão política (Demonstrations in public spaces: the street as a place of political expression), by Fabiano Rosa Magalhães (2013), it is made clear through the bias of the “Sociology of Demonstrations”¹³ that public demonstrations are collective actions, which precede the proto-trade union protests in the early stages of the Industrial Revolution. However, it is not appropriate to dwell on previous demonstrations of the model of the capitalist city¹⁴, since it is upon this that fall the forms of protest with which we are most familiar.

Taken initially as a fleeting response to a state of irrational, raging tempers (FREUD apud MAGALHÃES, 2013, p. 14), normally associated with the working class and trade unionists, social protests were only recognized as being legitimate during the 1960s, when there was an abundance of movements for the rights of women, blacks and homosexuals, for example. With regard to the validity of the demonstrations in the streets and public spaces, according to Magalhães (2013) it is possible to separate two theoretical fields: a) the Descriptive Democratic Theory, which views the demonstrations
with reservations, and; b) Political Philosophy, which indicates perspectives in order to “state how life should be” (MAGALHÃES, 2013, p. 16, author’s translation). Political Philosophy, represented by authors such as Arendt (2007), believes that democracy is an open field for new and constant incorporation of rights, including demonstrations and protests. These are validated because of the lack of space within representative political action, i.e., partisan and institutionalized.

With regard to the work of Pierre Favre (1990), Magalhães states that in principle, demonstrations are peaceful, express opinion, seek to seduce and grow, yearn for change and strive for publicity, but may also present violent consequences or develop into urban rebellion, not only due to being an agglomeration of many people with different behaviors and principles, but also because of the possible existence of provocateurs misaligned with peaceful protest or even the presence of undercover police - nothing new in relation to what has been witnessed in Brazil since 2013.

Apart from this, they also possess different targets, amongst which we may indicate the state, the public and the media. In Brazil, prior to the 1988 Constitution (Article 5, section XVI) it was possible for the state to intervene or veto public protest. Currently, however, the State’s presence is felt by recognizing that unpredictable outcomes are a possibility, and could endanger the integrity of persons whether connected or not to the demonstration, it should not however prevent peaceful protest under any circumstances. The public is the main target to which the demonstrations are aimed, which as a consequence, inserts the media as a necessary, strategic target, since this may broaden the visibility of the action (preferably in a favorable manner, which will go to promote the general acceptance and level of compliance/tolerance to the appeals of the demonstrators).

There are numerous, important options as to where the demonstrations may take place within the public space. From historical squares to the central avenues, they appropriate areas normally allocated to cars and businesses, which thus become politically subverted (SANTOS, 2002). An analysis on the appropriation of places usually regarded for consumption is especially relevant when analyzing the case of FIFA mega sports events, particularly since this institution obtained guarantees from the Brazilian government to hold the event in an “exclusive zone”, within a two kilometer perimeter surrounding the arenas. This ensured their advertising privileges, the sale of sponsored products and increased control over the right to come and go, curbing not only demonstrations and protests, many of which were legitimate, but also the actions of local merchants, street vendors and even traditional activities protected as intangible heritage, such as the case of the Bahia woman in Salvador selling their acarajé.

The symbolic use of the streets, the march from one place to another within the city, or from one specific city to the capital of the state, or even of the country, are done so in order to become visible and expand the symbolic expression of the demonstration. It should be remembered that since June 2013, Brazilian cities have been home to constant public protests, many of which have brought together hundreds of thousands of people, for example on the main Paulista Avenue in São Paulo, or in the Square of Three Powers in Brasilia. The proportions, the numbers involved and the symbolic gesture of occupying these particular places - and not just any place - form a combination of factors, which signifies that something deep is stirring the population to mobilize, which from certain speeches and discourses

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15 The Movement of the Bahian Acarajé Makers (women in the state of Bahia who make this traditional food) represented an important struggle for the women to gain their right, albeit on a limited scale, to sell their traditional food within the perimeter of the Arena Fonte Nova, an adverse situation which spread to the FIFA FanFests.
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It is our desire to explain that the critical point that led to the events of June 2013 and that has followed through until the present day – naturally, under various pretexts – encounters its reason for being in the very structure of our capitalist, globalized society, and it is clearly within this very same society that solutions should be sought in order to solve the problems that have led to the protests. By explaining that the reality of globalization has established a new paradigm, also signifies that escaping the influence of its perverse effects is not a simple matter, and among these effects is the progressive loss of a political voice, since any violent act against the human condition naturally generates rebellion and mobilization. By choosing to introduce the contributions of authors such as Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, the latter being a scholar of Deleuze, into this analysis, we are banking on the fact that because they wrote a major work inspired by the book entitled Empire, which deals precisely with the exercise of power in the times of globalization, together with the fact that they also worked with the concept of “multitude” as a resistant response “empire”, it would be possible to move slightly beyond critical analysis in order to corroborate the proposal of the authors. However, before presenting their contribution from Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (2005), it would be appropriate to address a number of key points contained within the vision of this work from other sources.

Initially, it is necessary to state that the suppression of political exercise is equivalent in many ways to the suppression of the human condition, to paraphrase the work of Hannah Arendt (2007), The Human Condition, and which is why any attempt to reconquer it is so important. The author states that the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century have employed strategies to ensure that certain groups of people became politically “invisible” and disposable, but the real criticism is that although these regimes have been defeated, the temptation to adopt these resources remains and is compatible with capitalist democratic societies, although through different justifications and means. In other words, what Arendt calls animal laborans refers to the man who assumes political value as that which is only productive through work and being able to consume, in a cycle that is constant and apparently increasingly more extreme. But if the protests mentioned thus far demonstrate that even the middle class is being positioned on the edges of this effective political recognition process (not the simulacrum of representative politics that seems to be one of the reasons behind the protests in Brazil), it is easy to understand the reason for the large number of heterogeneous manifestations: it is no longer just a problem of the poor.

Arendt’s reflection on the “glorification of animal laborans” is clearly associated with the relationship between biopower and biopolitics addressed by Hardt and Negri due to the fact that it manifests as a form of political violence, supporting

\[16\] Traditionally, as indicated by Arendt (2007), political invisibility has been associated to poverty; but authors such as Santos (2000), Hardt and Negri (2005) and Sassen (2011) have demonstrated that this ideas should be expanded to contemporary globalized societies.

\[17\] In order to help conceptualize, biopower is related to the investment in control technology of the production networks, their management and neutralization; biopolitical production is land and the means of action in the struggle between cooperation networks and regulatory forces, or modulators, of biopower (HARDT; NEGRI, 2005).
the current reflection of authors seeking to describe this critical point in globalized contemporary societies moving away from the stage of discipline (FOUCAULT, 1999) towards societies of control and of the market. Here, the logic is marked by sales, merit pay, continuous control as opposed to examination, the factory giving way to the enterprise and the inadequacy of the old resistance systems (such as unions), to the extent that individuals cease to be a sum of the masses in order to enter a regime of fluid working, of “inexpiable rivalry” (DELEUZE, 2010, p. 225, author’s translation), the solution to which seems to be able to come through other weapons (as in the example of the autonomous demonstrations and the experience the “multitude”).

The ideology advocated by the “perverse globalization”, a term used by Professor Milton Santos (2000) in *Por uma outra globalização: do pensamento único à consciência universal* (For another globalization: from a single thought to universal consciousness), contains very concrete and non-fanciful consequences. The beginning of this century presented a number of characteristics that favored maintaining this ideology, which had appeared during the last decades of the twentieth century. According to the author, the development of history always moves forward in conjunction with technique, its uniqueness, underpinned mainly by the computer and its derivatives, a strong element capable of creating, disseminating and maintaining globalization as we know it today. The uniqueness of the technique, the convergence of moments, the presence of a “single engine” (i.e., value-added universal, explains Santos) and the understanding of the planet, i.e., becoming aware of the facts, dimensions and historical and socioeconomic processes on a world scale (albeit in an unrealistic and biased manner), based the establishment of globalization onto being something inevitable, natural and of a single world discourse (SANTOS, 2000).

The advancement of communication allowed dissemination of a lot of knowledge and also shortened distances, but much of what is affordable for most people is duly filtered and suitable for global ideology. According to the author, the tyranny of money and the monopoly of information form the supporting pillar of contemporary globalization, accelerating hegemonic processes supported by one thought, able to absorb other productive social processes or weaken and disrupt those that offer resistance. This framework, in which it seems to be impossible to swim against the current or at least extremely risky, implies that processes unrelated to these logics are uncompetitive (which already indicates that globalization itself provides the means for resistance).

In the ideology of globalization, even man himself has his exchange value identified in his productive and competitive capacity. There is no place for everyone and exclusion, social bankruptcy and unemployment are viewed as something natural, part of the ideology of meritocracy, something destined for the least able, as well as establishing that a political voice is directly associated with the fulfillment of these expectations. Within this programmed reality, the state itself eludes its role as protector of its citizens, and politics is driven by market interests, not principles. However, since the positions of privilege have become scarce with the intensification of inequality, and political invisibility seems to hit both the very poor and the middle class, this logic also appears increasingly untenable.

It is within this scenario that an appropriation may begin of Hardt and Negri’s work (although the resistance strategy they propose will only will be discussed later). According to the authors, there is a “Global Empire” that places everyone in a constant
The metaphor of “war” is appropriate because it is a state which seeks the indistinct collaboration of all segments in favor of a guiding objective, conducting a war against poverty, against drugs, terrorism or against national shame (a strategy that combines perfectly with a convincing speech in the organization of mega events, for example, which will help to justify a series of arbitrary and repressive attitudes - and protests in response to these attitudes - as we little by little have indicated throughout this work).

It is also understood that in this state of global war, international relations and internal politics become confused, appearing similar and interconnected, with no clear boundaries. Hardt and Negri specify that military and police activities are interlinked to ensure security, and no longer national defense. The “enemy”, which was traditionally embodied in an external threat, is increasingly confused with the so-called “dangerous classes” or dangerous groups related to the internal threat. By becoming increasingly difficult to differentiate - the so-called black blocs, party militants, infiltrated people, hoodlums, “terrorists” or simply citizens engaged in the struggle for a political voice – low-intensity war policies or high-intensity police actions are oft adopted by one or sometimes by another (HARDT; NEGRI, 2005, p. 36). The consequence of this posture is often to adopt an idea of a “fair war” against evil or an obvious, absolute enemy, an enemy of humanity, of physical and patrimonial collective security, rioters and vandals, and therefore liable to be removed from the political sphere and have their rights curtailed.

Whether someone is a terrorist or not is a viewpoint which is increasingly flexible, but it is commonplace that the prerogative of deciding rests with the state and its agents in the alleged zeal for public safety. This invisible threat begins to curtail individual rights by escaping the ordinary legal and judiciary process for a number of absurd and exceptional reasons, as in the attempt to establish the PL 728/2011, called the “AI-5 of the Cup,” by providing the possibility of qualifying any manifestation that causes panic or mass fear as a terrorist activity, especially in acts involving public transport.

What we would like to certify at this point is that the metaphor of global war appointed by the authors, is the experience of the State of Exception, of the exceptionality of the laws in daily life and the deadlock of political exercise, reasons that mobilize the search for alternatives – in the state of war there is no true compatibility with justice or with democracy. In the Hardt and Negri metaphor, it is possible during war to encounter both an obedient regime and a partial or total suspension of the exercise of democracy - circumstances made commonplace in mega-events, for example. The difference is that in the modern era these were exceptional and temporary circumstances - in a state of permanent global war the suspension of democratic activities also tends to be permanent, so much so that the demonstrations and protests on the networks and streets seem plausible strategies within a barely transparent, participative discredited political reality through the formally established means.
THE “MULTITUDE” AS A POSSIBILITY FOR RESISTANCE AND RESPONSE WITHIN A NETWORK SOCIETY

At this point we trust that a certain comparative link is clear between the concept of “multitude” and its applicability in the demonstrations and protests that have gained space in Brazil and across the world. It is expressed as a response and resistance to the concept of biopower, which is this attempt to control all spheres of life, which enables the exercise of dominion within the “gray” areas between war and peace, which is exactly where the non-conventional conflicts of contemporary life appear. The more biopower becomes multidimensional, no domination is complete or without resistance (HARDT; NEGRI, 2005), hence the importance of reflecting on the multitude and the validity of protests in contemporaneity.

Therefore, the watchword is resistance - although this needs to be conducted through channels that biopower cannot penetrate. It is therefore important that a manner is found that, for the paths of resistance, uses tools that are multidimensional and able to impose themselves upon these unconventional “gray” conflicts, in the same manner as biopower. With regard to these possible strategies of resistance, the authors appropriated the “network” model in order to demonstrate that this is a development of guerrilla resistance, which acts on the possibility of multiple attacks on the oppressor by means of various groups that are related to one another, exploring the problem of “a lack of targets”, much like the hydra, the mythological Greek monster with multiple heads. The network strategy of resistance, even more so than the guerrillas, does not even have heads to be “cut off”, nor can it be reduced to a unified command. On the network, relatively autonomous units comprise a multiplicity with amorphous characteristics, capable of being in several places or even disperse to the point of invisibility. The concept of “multitude” enters to understand the biopolitical struggles on the network, since this is where the heterogeneous singularities interact.

Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri describe the concept of the multitude as a form of seeking a new political exercise, capable of placing itself as resistance, or even revolution, against the power currently in office. The multitude is expressed as a power (NEGRI, 2004, p. 17), the possibility of going beyond measure and becoming part of the “General Intellect”20, or increasingly obtaining the fruits of intellectual activity and immaterial products, which are absolutely biopolitical by creating not only products, but relationships and social experiences. The multitude is not a manipulable, disorganized social body like people, but an active, organized social actor, a promoter of self-organization, capable of promoting the freedom of revolutionary potentials. Thus, the multitude may escape the influence of biopower, since it is directed to act on the unity of the subject (the people), the forms of organization (contract between individuals) and government regimes (monarchy, democracy, etc.) i.e., elements alien to the concept of the multitude.

In a more pragmatic analysis, the multitude extrapolates and binds the models of resistance within itself, allowing resistance both within the law, seeking to neutralize oppressive effects of the law, and completely outside the law, when it effectively enables the struggle to build a new society. As Hardt and Negri clearly explain in the subchapter The wealth of the poor (or we are all poor!) (HARDT; NEGRI, 2005), the multitude is also an inclusive concept, allowing political exercise on the same

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20 A concept formulated by Marx which Negri (2004) used to define the actions of the multitude.
level as the very poor and the “traditionally excluded”, in that it sees in these the combination of rich, unique experiences, as well as a natural vocation for antagonism and rebellion. This perspective is shared by Milton Santos (2000) whereby in the constant, cyclical shortage of consumer goods, which he extends to the shortage of rights and socio-political visibility, he indicates the necessary impetus for change and political participation. Understanding this perspective seems to be a revolutionary step in attempting to escape the aforementioned cruel *animal laborans*.

The local revolt communicates with other revolts by recognizing what is common, in the form of an *international cycle of struggles*, like a contagious disease (HARDT; NEGRI, 2005). The communication of common practices and desires, participation in collaborative networks, the revolutionary appropriation of the media and the tools once monopolized by the oppressor, together with immaterial production, form a reactive, active and creative cycle, in which the wealth of each local experience reinforces the political voice of the multitude. Therefore it is necessary to assess the described international, and above all, national experiences, amongst which are the *Jornadas de Junho*.

As an integral part of the process of resistance, this is revealed, therefore, in three principles: a) that of historical opportunity; b) that in which the most effective form of resistance uses the same “weapons” as the oppressor; and c) that in which each expression of resistance creates movements and progressively democratic processes at the same time that it destroys the antidemocratic characteristics of previous models.

We may conclude that, according to the authors, each manifestation on the network, collaborative action and legitimate immaterial production seeking to attend the common desire, would be a progressive and continuous improvement towards a more democratic experience in globalized societies, in which Brazil is included.

**FINAL CONSIDERATIONS (BEYOND THE JORNADAS DE JUNHO...)**

Looking back, it may be said that the *Jornadas de Junho* if 2013, and the entire context, which involved Brazil hosting the 2014 World Cup, was a revealing experience and far from isolated. This was not merely a rejection of football or indeed FIFA. Disapproval was stronger and more widespread due to dissatisfaction with the direction that the nation was taking, and because of the government’s strong retaliation in an attempt to defend the interests of a controversial nonprofit entity. Apparently, the mega-events model inspired by the Barcelona Olympics in 1992, divulged in such a positive manner by the organizers, public administrators and even some of those more aligned to the theoretical proposals of Strategic Planning21, was being met with open antagonism22. It is generally known that Stockholm, St Moritz and Munich have rejected the 2022 Winter Olympics - the populations have given clear signs of rejection. Similarly, the mayor of New York, Bill de Blasio, announced in May 2014 that the city would not receive the Summer Olympics in 2024, and in Brazil the wave of protests related to the 2016 Olympics persists, and may intensify to the extent that the “dream of the Olympic legacy” disperses in a similar manner to that of the FIFA World Cup, as indicated by Rafael Alcadipani (KAWAGUTI, 2015).

On the other hand, also according to Alcadipani, it is similarly likely that

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21 A model for urban planning inspired by business techniques developed by the Harvard Business School and widely defended by authors such as Borja (1996).

22 Authors such as Matheson and Baade (2004), Matheson (2006) and Maening and Plessis (2007) developed studies, which indicate that the material legacy of the mega-events are far less significant that officially stated (when they exist and they do not leave exorbitant debts).
the wave of anti-government demonstrations continue in 2016, so that within this scenario, the dispute between the pro- and anti-PT groups could take over the agenda of the protesters more than the actual Olympics itself. It has become common practice to observe rallies and marches spilling over from the virtual media onto the streets, either in favor of impeaching the president, as on August 16th 2015, or for the affirmation of racial struggles (such as the recent Crespo (Afro/curly hair) Pride March in São Paulo) or, as expected, for a more transparent, democratic and less authoritarian 2016 Olympic Games, than other mega-events recently held in Brazil. This last point seems especially challenging within the current context, since on August 12th 2015, the House of Representatives approved the basic text of Bill 2016/2015, which deals with counter-terrorism. The project presents severe criticism, especially because of extremely vague, broad definitions, potentially damaging to social movements and to full political exercise. With the proximity of the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro, a similar scenario is evident on attempting to pass the aforementioned “AI-5 of the Cup.”

As the development of “supra-partisan” political structures becomes increasingly more common, recognizing common issues on the agendas that mobilize riots and marches, the individual merits of which we will avoid herein, there is a trace, when the “ball starts rolling” (to use a common expression from the 2014 World Cup), of tempers becoming calmed by the furor that a mega-event brings - or the repression that the state is able to mobilize. In this sense, according to Alcadipani, the police have learned to deal with the protesters and black blocs with “techniques” that bring fear to the people, together with the use of a large contingent of up to 2,000 men (KAWAGUTI, 2015). The fact is that the demonstrations of June 2013 were not repeated with the same intensity during the days of the 2014 World Cup, and most probably will not be repeated during the 2016 Olympics. On the other hand, there has been no evidence of a major police crackdown on protests calling for the impeachment of President Dilma (Figure 2), nor for those defending her stay, on the contrary, both have gained ground and presented huge numbers of people – normally with large differences between police data and that of the organizers - including maps of the demonstrations as from March 2015 (similar to that produced during the Jornadas de Junho, as mentioned above). Within a climate of emotional shock that a mega-sports event may provide, even the international press gave in to the fact, at least from the viewpoint of a sporting competition, that it was the “Cup of Cups”. Numerous declarations on social networks, texts published in newspaper columns, among others, publicly lamented the fact that they had followed the wave of pessimism and regretted not being able to enjoy the games with their friends, who had simply ignored what appeared to be a sure failure. Apparently the “World Cup effect” had completely destroyed the ability to distinguish between fair demands that erupted during the last year of global preparations and the possibility of enjoying and cheering along with millions of people, as has always been the case in the so-called “Country of Football”.

Will we experience the same with an “Olympics effect”? Will the political and truly democratic potential of the multitude, as exposed by Hardt and Negri, also be co-opted and somehow corrupted, or deleted by a more efficient police apparatus that is not effectively able to distinguish legitimate protests from those that “shatter order”, as described by Alcadipani? In a process which is so open and willing to absorb
the numerous singular voices, many of these will be dissonant and some collective experiences will generate lesser gains; however, errors are invariably experienced, seen and shared (on the networks too, of course), and are certainly reinterpreted and given new meaning by so many other “multitudes”. For now, at least it is possible to envisage new horizons for political exercise - the voices of the multitude are meeting in the streets and appropriating them politically.

Figure 2: The multitude during the demonstrations of March 2015


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